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Abstract 
 
Philosophers of science and meta-scientists alike now 
typically model scientists’ behavior as driven by credit 
maximization. In this paper I argue that this modeling 
assumption cannot account for how scientists have a default 
level of trust in each other’s assertions. The normative 
implication of this is that science policy should not only focus 
on incentive reform.  
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
When thinking about the social structures of science, philosophers of science and meta-
scientists have for some time now predominantly adopted an ‘economic approach’, where 
scientists are modeled as credit-maximizing agents responding to incentives such as promotion, 
funding, or publication criteria (Kitcher 1990; Strevens 2006; Higginson and Munafò 2016; 
Smaldino and McElreath 2016; Heesen 2018; Holman and Bruner 2017; O’Connor 2019). 
Yet in applied ethics, sociology of science, and to a large extent actual science policy 
making, an ‘ethical approach’ informs research on social structures of science: scientists are 
predominantly understood to be agents concerned with ideals such as honesty, respect, or 
reliability, and are capable of acting contrary to incentive structures (Carvalho 2017; Desmond 
2019; ESF-ALLEA 2017; Forsberg et al. 2018; Godecharle et al. 2013). 
Philosophers of science and meta-scientists do not openly dismiss the ethical approach. 
Yet, it does often not seem so clear what precisely, if anything, the ethical approach brings to 
the explanatory table that cannot be covered by the economic approach. For instance, concern 
with honesty could be explained as minimizing the expected penalties (negative credit) 
following a strategy of dishonesty; concern for reliability could be explained as maximizing 
replicable studies, which can be modeled as having a higher pay-off than non-replicable studies 
(as in Heesen 2018). 
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What is it, if anything, that prevents one from taking a cynical stance on the ideals of 
individual scientists, i.e., that they are mere window-dressing, ineffectual against the brutal 
reality of credit-maximization? Indeed, the view that scientists should be credit-maximizers, in 
interests of scientific progress, seems viable (Kitcher 1990). 
The importance of this question extends to science policy, which often is implicitly 
informed by an economic approach. Consider for instance how, in order to increase individual 
scientists’ honesty, some have called for increased penalties for fraud, even to the extent of 
making criminal prosecutions scientific misconduct more widespread (see e.g. Collier 2015). 
Similarly, it is proposed that individuals’ concern for reliability can be improved by 
incentivizing replication research, for instance by giving funding and “badges” to scientists 
doing replication studies (Munafò et al. 2017), or by introducing “Replication Awards” 
(Gorgolewski et al. 2018). 
This paper will suggest that the explanatory limits of the economic approach are 
reached concerning the phenomenon of default trust between scientists. This will be defined in 
detail later on (section 2), but the core idea is that scientists tend to believe that their colleagues 
are telling the truth – or are at least attempting to do so. This default trust in each others’ 
assertions underlies many core scientific behaviors – I consider peer review and collaboration 
as illustrative examples – and thus may be considered integral to scientific research.  
Given widespread problems with reproducibility and replicability1 (Baker 2016) – or at 
least, the perception of such problems (Fanelli 2018) – such default trust can be said to be under 
pressure. I then consider one of the most important proposed policy reforms to the credit-based 
incentive structure of science: incentivizing replication research. Replication research basically 
acts to disincentivize low-credence assertions. Can it safeguard default trust? Using an 
expanded version of Heesen’s model of when replicable (or trustworthy) assertions maximize 
credit (section 3), I will then show that, no matter how much replication research is 
incentivized, default trust cannot be justified in a culture of credit-maximization (section 4).  
The upshot is that, on the descriptive side, the economic model cannot account for an 
important explanandum concerning scientific practice (i.e., default trust). On the normative 
side, it means that in a culture of extreme credit-maximization, default trust between scientists 
would ultimately be eroded, and replaced with a ‘default lack of trust’ (or default distrust), and 
this would be detrimental to science.  
 
1 I will adopt the National Academy of Science’s definition of reproducibility and replicability (basically: 
obtaining consistent results by redoing the same analysis on the same data, versus confirming a hypothesis with 
different data and/or methods). See (NAS 2019, p. 46). 
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2. Default Trust in Scientific Research 
 
In the literature on trust (for summary, see Hawley 2012), trust in an assertion p  is 
typically understood to depend on the asserting agent’s knowledge that p and honesty. If the 
agent either lacks knowledge, or is dishonest, trust would be inappropriate. For the particular 
issue of the trustworthiness of scientists’ assertions (i.e., observations, hypotheses, theories), 
whether scientists operate with a knowledge norm of assertion (Williamson 2002), or merely 
posit empirically successful hypotheses is, of course, a vexed issue concerning epistemology 
and scientific realism that I would like to sidestep here. Instead I will analyze a scientist’s 
assertion 𝜑 as type of action, where the trustworthiness of an action depends on the agent’s 
competence to carry out 𝜑 successfully and intention to carry out 𝜑 (see Hawley 2012). For 
example, if a climate scientist tells me that humans are responsible for global warming, I will 
trust that assertion when I believe that the climate scientist has the right type of competence 
(understanding of climatological processes, familiarity with the data, understanding of 
statistical methods) and the intention to tell the truth (and thus, for instance, to carefully 
consider alternative hypotheses). 
With this in mind, I posit following thesis: 
Default Trust (DT). If scientist A with competence in field F makes an assertion 𝜑, 
then scientist B is believes 𝜑, unless B has an honest disagreement 𝜑 due to an 
incompatible prior belief 𝜑’.  
The trust is ‘default’ in the sense that the trustworthiness of A is not called into question: if A 
possesses the right type of competence, A can be trusted because A’s intention to tell the truth 
is not doubted. Default trust does not imply agreement: B can withhold high credence in 𝜑 if 𝜑 is incompatible with a prior belief 𝜑′ of B. 
 DT can be read both normatively and descriptively. A normative reading of it accepts 
that in reality the expectations scientists have of each other may not be accurately described as 
‘default trust’. For instance, a sensational but questionable assertion 𝜑 that enhances A’s career 
could be distrusted by colleagues. Yet, in a normative reading of DT, default trust between 
scientific colleagues would be desirable for the scientific ethos.  
This paper, unless otherwise specified, will primarily be concerned with the descriptive 
reading: DT between scientific colleagues characterizes a number of core scientific practices. 
This descriptive reading does not imply that the scientific ethos is only defined by DT – there 
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is room for lack of trust and distrust, under certain circumstances. It holds that the activity of 
scientific research is characterized by considerable DT.  
Take for instance peer-review. As is often acknowledged, the peer-review system is not 
designed to detect intentional fraud (Crocker and Cooper 2011; Horbach and Halffman 2018). 
When peer-reviewer B evaluates an assertion 𝜑 by author A, B does not necessarily have a 
way of detecting falsification or fabrication by analysis of the manuscript alone. Image 
manipulation (of e.g. Western blots) or statistically unlikely patterns in the raw data can be 
detected; nonetheless, high-profile cases of repeated fabrication went undetected by peer 
review (such as Diederik Stapel, cf. discussion in Crocker and Cooper 2011). The peer-
reviewer can only primarily check the soundness of the manuscript: possible errors in the 
methodology or reasoning, or check the various assertions against the background of his or her 
own beliefs. In other words, primarily honest errors will be checked for.  
Collaborations are also impossible without default trust. Consider a collaboration 
between two scientists, A and B, of different specializations (or competences), where B uses 
A’s analysis and conclusion 𝜑 to support further analysis. Then B must ultimately trust A’s 
assertion	𝜑	 unless B wants to redo A’s work.  Depending on the degree to which 𝜑 was 
unexpected for B, B may of course check in with A for honest errors, and whether various of 
A’s implicit sub-assertions 𝜑!, 𝜑", … actually imply	𝜑, but at some point B must trust A’s work 
and will not be able to check everything without actually redoing A’s work. In this sense, trust 
is necessary to collaboration: without trust, collaboration becomes literally impossible, since 
one partner must do or redo all the work. 
These core practices illustrate how communication between scientists is permeated by 
default trust, and that, were such default trust not justified in most cases, then many core 
scientific practices including peer-review and collaboration would need to be abandoned. Since 
it is not obvious how a competitive, credit-maximizing model of scientific endeavor can 
explain such justified default trust, the justified default trust among scientists can be interpreted 
as an expanandum that should be accounted for.  
For the following we will be focusing attention on the question (in connection to credit-
maximization): when is default trust justified? Here it is important to distinguish between two 
ways in which B’s trust in scientist A’s assertion can be undermined. The first is by reasons to 
believe that A made an (honest) error in the experimental design, data collection, or data 
analysis. Thus the assertion 𝜑 may not be compatible with the other agent’s existing (high 
credence) beliefs, prompting skepticism towards 𝜑. Note that such reasons can undermine trust 
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in whole fields F, for instance by if it becomes known that a whole field is suffering from 
widespread methodological problems (see e.g. Sorkin et al. 2016). However, such undermining 
reasons do not undermine default trust: A’s intention to tell the truth is not doubted.  
The second way, and more relevant for purposes here, is how trust can be undermined 
is by learning about the intentions of the scientist for asserting 𝜑. For instance, if scientist A 
claims that ‘smoking does not cause lung cancer’ and scientist B finds out that the scientist is 
being funded by a tobacco company, this not only undermines any trust B might have had in 𝜑, but also undermines B’s default trust in A.  
 
3. Credit-Maximizing Norms of Assertion 
What is particularly pernicious or disturbing about the problems of sloppy science – the 
widespread cutting of corners – is that it suggests a widespread culture of scientists putting 
career over the truth, and hence presents a ubiquitous defeater for the default trust in any 
scientist. In fact, scientists long have reported that trust is undermined by an incentive structure 
that actively promotes competition and that is largely based on metrics (Anderson et al. 2007). 
The question I will consider is: can the credit-maximizing incentive structure be reformed in 
such a way that default trust is safeguarded? 
I will approach this question in the following way: how can the norm of assertion of a 
credit-maximizing scientist be manipulated by incentivizing replication, such that default trust 
in that scientist’s assertions is justified? The norm of assertion can be stated as follows: 
Credit-Maximizing Norm of Assertion. Scientist A will choose to assert 𝜑 out of an 
associated set of possible assertions Φ when 𝜑 maximizes the expected credit function 𝐶. 
Here 𝜑’s associated set of possible assertions is defined as Φ =	 {𝜑, 𝜑#, 𝜑##, … }, where the 
various 𝜑(%) are variations, sometimes minute, of the same basic idea, but with different, 
sometimes radically different, expected pay-off or credit 𝐶(𝜑(%)).  
Note that this norm of assertion is very unlike the norms of assertion traditionally 
defended by epistemologists (Williamson 2002), which for instance state that an agent can only 
assert 𝜑 when the agent knows 𝜑, or has a high credence in 𝜑. Within a credit maximizing 
model, it may be ‘rational’ for a scientist A to assert 𝜑 even though A does not know 𝜑, and 
may even have a low credence in 𝜑. The question of how this norm of assertion precisely 
overlaps or contrasts with other norms of assertion defended by epistemologists (e.g. Lackey 
2007) is outside the scope of this paper. 
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Stating that such a norm of assertion is rational (relative to a credit-maximizing 
framework) does not mean that it is necessarily desirable. An unchecked growth in assertions 
with low credence would mean the death of science, since discourse would be flooded with 
low credence (and likely false) statements. Hence in a credit maximization model, there needs 
to be a correction mechanism that disincentivizes low-credence assertions, and the main 
mechanism that is considered today is replication research.  
To further operationalize this norm of assertion, I will expand on Heesen’s model of 
how credit-maximizing scientists should balance speed of output with replicability (Heesen 
2018). Assertions that cannot be replicated have negative expected credit (e.g., through 
reputation loss); yet there is a tradeoff between the credence in a publication (and its 
replicability) and the speed of publication. Hence Heesen uses following expected credit 
function: 𝐶(𝑝) = 	 𝑐'𝛽𝑝𝜆(𝑝) + 𝑐(𝛼(1 − 𝑝)𝜆(𝑝) 
p = scientist’s credence that publication is accurate (and also the 
credence that the article is replicable) 𝜆(𝑝) = expected speed for a publication of replicability p α = probability of acceptance of erroneous article 𝛽 = probability of acceptance of accurate article 𝑐(/𝑐' = average credit accrual with erroneous/accurate article 
Note that Heesen’s model, the ‘replicability’2 of an assertion is scientist A’s credence in an 
assertion, and not the actual replicability: the assumption is thus that this subjective 
reproducibility closely adheres to actual reproducibility (for if not, and if the scientists’ own 
estimates of replicability were no indication of actual replicability, credit maximization would 
not be a very good strategy to actually maximize credit). 
The credit-maximizing norm of assertion based on Heesen’s expected credit function 
can be described as follows. A scientist must decide between a set of possible assertions Φ =	{𝜑, 𝜑#, 𝜑##, … , 𝜑())}, where 𝜑 has the lowest replicability (but requires the least supporting 
work to assert) and 𝜑()) has the highest replicability (and requires the most supporting work 
to assert). The norm of assertion is not to choose to assert the 𝜑(%) in which the scientist has 
highest credence, but rather, to assert the 𝜑(*) that has the best trade-off between replicability 
and speed of publication (and thus highest expected credit).  
 
2 Heesen uses the term ‘reproducibility’, but given sentences like “The reproducibility of scientific research is a 
cornerstone of the scientific method. If science is to discover general laws or principles, it should not matter 
who tests them, or when, or where.”, he seems to be referring to replicability according to NAS’s definition (see 
n1). 
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This credit-maximizing norm does not necessarily undermine default trust. In fact, it 
could be reinterpreted as describing a form of practical judgment: attempting to do the best 
research one can, without succumbing to the temptations of perfectionism. Perfectionism in 
research describes how a researcher ekes out marginal improvements in accuracy at great cost, 
thus sabotaging future research. From an ethical perspective, there is nothing necessarily un-
integrous about avoiding perfectionism. It is still about doing the best research one can, but 
considered over a longer time-scale instead of one publication at a time. 
 However, scientists’ credit-maximizing incentive structure is more complex than a 
trade-off between accuracy and speed, and Heesen’s model would need to be expanded to map 
the issues concerning default trust. Heesen assumes that every assertion will be subject to 
replication research. However, in reality there are too many assertions to be checked: by some 
estimates (Ware and Mabe 2015), 2.5 million articles were published in 2014, with a historical 
growth rate of 3%, so by this logic about 3 million articles will be published in 2020. Not all 
original assertions can be subjected to replication research. The normative guidelines on 
replication also reflect this reality: a recent normative guideline on replication research 
explicitly recommends replication researchers prioritizing those assertions when the results 
from replication will have an “major impact on scientific knowledge” (KNAW 2018). So to 
put it more crudely: do not attempt to replicate insignificant assertions. Hence I posit the 
following additional factor influencing the credit-maximizing norm:  
Significance of an assertion 𝝋. Novel, important, or surprising assertions gain more 
attention than trivial or wholly expected assertions, and are more likely to be the target 
of replication research. 
A further complication I would like to introduce is the fact that replication studies do not always 
give clear answers (Gilbert et al. 2016). One can submit an assertion 𝜑 to replication research, 
and subsequently not be able to decide whether 𝜑 has been confirmed or falsified. This is 
especially the case where direct replications (where all necessary elements of a procedure are 
replicated, but with different data) are not possible, leaving only conceptual replications (where 
the procedure is varied). While it a complex and ongoing question how replications should be 
conducted (for extensive discussion, see Zwaan et al. 2018), it is safe to say that some assertions 
are more falsifiable by replication studies than others, and that this falsifiability is relatively 
independent of the significance of the assertion. Hence I posit a third factor influencing the 
credit-maximizing norm:  
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Falsifiability of an assertion 𝝋. Some assertions can be easily confirmed or falsified 
by replication studies, whereas for other assertions, especially those relying on complex 
data, replication studies do not either confirm or falsify the original assertion.  
In sum, the set of possible assertions Φ can be mapped out on a three-dimensional space where 
the axes are: significance, falsifiability, and accuracy. These three dimensions determine 
either whether an assertion will be subjected to replication research at all (significance), and 
the probability the replication research will yield a clear confirmation, or a clear falsification, 
or neither (falsifiability and accuracy). 
This means that four scenarios must be distinguished with regards to the fate of an 
assertion with regards to replicability. (1) The assertion is conclusively successfully replicated, 
with probability 𝑃(↑) and credit accrual 𝐶↑. (2) The assertion conclusively fails to replicate, 
with probability 𝑃(↓) and credit accrual of 𝐶↓. (3) The assertion does not either conclusively 
replicate, nor is conclusively falsified (not replicated), with probability 𝑃(↔) and credit accrual 	𝐶↔. (4) The assertion is not subjected to a replication study, with probability 𝑃(0) and credit 
accrual 𝐶..  
As does Heesen (2018), I will assume that 𝐶↑ is the largest value, and 𝐶↓ the smallest. 
In addition, I will assume that 	𝐶↔ is larger than 𝐶., because an assertion that is not deemed 
significant to replicate will typically only be published in lower-ranking journals, whereas 
some results that cannot be conclusively reproduced find their way into a high-ranking journal 
(as documented by Brembs 2018).  
 With these four scenarios, the expected credit function of an assertion 𝜑 made by 
scientist A becomes :  𝐶/	(𝜑) = 	𝐶↑	𝑃(↑) +	𝐶↓𝑃(↓) +	 	𝐶↔𝑃(↔) + 	𝐶.𝑃(0)                       (*) 
Here the exogeneous structural incentive for replication research (e.g., funding, badges, or 
awards) is inversely correlated with the probability an assertion of average significance is not 
subjected to a replication study. (If an assertion is very significant (or insignificant), the 
probability of being subjected to replication may be 1 (or 0) regardless of the strength of the 
structural incentive). 
This function depends on three independent variables3, and thus the topology of 
extrema of 𝐶/ can be considerably more complex than that in Heesen’s model (which had one 
independent variable, namely the replicability of an assertion). In other words, there is no single 
way to maximize credit. Scientist A can choose between two possible assertions that are more 
 
3 The four probability values are constrained by 𝑃(↑) + 	𝑃(↔) + 𝑃(↓) + 𝑃(0) = 1 
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and less likely to be successfully replicated, but can also choose between assertions that are 
more and less falsifiable and more and less significant. 
 
 In a culture of credit-maximization, where a norm of assertion based on credit function 𝐶∗	is common knowledge, A asserts 𝜑 when 𝐶/	(𝜑) is maximal, and B knows that A only 
asserts 𝜑 when 𝐶/	(𝜑) is maximal. 𝐶/	and B’s credit function 𝐶1 may not necessarily be 
maximized by the same assertion 𝜑, for instance in some collaborations where B is lead author 
and is taking most responsibility. Hence the question: can, in a culture where it is common 
knowledge credit-maximization, incentivizing replication research safeguard B’s default trust 
in A? 
 Despite 𝐶∗	not having obvious maxima, what is perhaps more realistic of actual 
reasoning processes is how credit-maximizing solutions can be attained iteratively instead of 
analytically, by a search strategy consisting of a series of decision.  This search thus consists 
of decision tree an agent will follow in a quest to maximize credit. Credit maximization, and 
not truth-telling per se, determines the calculus behind every decision.  
As an example of a rather simple search strategy, consider the following: the scientist 
first starts with the most significant assertion, which maximizes the largest credit accrual type 𝐶↑, and from there goes down the ladder of pay-offs guided by 𝐶↑ > 	𝐶↔ > 	𝐶. > 𝐶↓. In more 
detail:  
(a) Look for a maximally significant 𝜑 (minimizing	𝑃(0)).  
(b) If, with some effort, it can be made sufficiently reproducible (maximizing 𝑃(↑) 
while minimizing 𝑃(↔) and 𝑃(↓)) then assert. This is the ideal, maximum pay-off 
scenario.  
(c) If, with another additional effort, 𝜑 unfalsifiability can be maximized, then assert. 
(d) If not consider a next assertion	𝜑# in Φ with slightly lower significance, and either 
(when potential pay-off is high enough) go through the same process again, or else 
consider the project to be a failure and move on to the next. 
(e) If stopping without assertion is not an option (e.g. due to large investment in starting 
up the project), then in the worst case scenario the search process is stopped when 
arriving at a maximally significant assertion 𝜑()) that just about insignificant enough 
that it will not attract any attention. Such a norm can be asserted.  
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Figure 1: An example of a decision tree a credit-maximizing scientist could use to search 𝛷 
for an assertion with maximal expected credit.  
Note that this decision-making process makes two, reasonably plausible, assumptions. The first 
is that a scientist must also decide whether it is worth continuing the search, or in other words, 
whether the extra additional investment needed for continuing the search is smaller than the 
expected payoff. The second is that peer review does not present an obstacle for the assertion 
of 𝜑, so that if 𝜑 is unfalsifiable, that the scientist is sufficiently experienced to hide the 
unfalsifiability. If 𝜑 is not highly significant, then the assertion will be published in a lower-
ranked journal. 
 
4. Credit Maximization and Trust 
The credit-maximizing reasoning sketched in Figure 1 is put forward primarily for 
illustrative & heuristic purposes. It is linear and highly simplified, and does not necessarily 
reflect, for instance, how researchers may simultaneously consider multiple possible assertions. 
What is important is that in a credit-maximizing culture, scientist B knows that A followed 
some credit-maximizing decision-making tree, and thus A could assert 𝜑 without knowing 𝜑 
or even having a high credence in 𝜑. 
Consider maximally 
significant φ. 
Can it be made 
sufficiently 
reproducible? 
Assert Can it be madesufficiently 
unfalsifiable?
Assert Do not assert
NoYes
Consider slightly 
less significant φ’
Is P(0) large enough
to assert? 
Assert
Stop project and 
move on to next
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When is scientist B justified in defaultly trusting an assertion 𝜑 of scientist A? Recall that 
default trust can be undermined by beliefs about the intentions of A. B has least reason to not 
to trust A when B receives indications that 𝑃(↑) is maximized. Since 𝑃(↑) is also A’s credence 
in 𝜑, this is cognitively inaccessible to B; thus B must estimate 𝑃(↑) by other means. And when 
replication research is incentivized this is possible. The significance of 𝜑 means that 𝜑 is likely 
to be submitted to replication research (𝑃(0) is low). The falsifiability of 𝜑 means that a 
replication study of 𝜑 will be conclusive (𝑃(↔) is low). Hence, perceptions of the significance 
and falsifiability of A’s assertion 𝜑 would be good grounds to believe that A’s asserts 𝜑 while 
also having a high credence in 𝜑. Given these considerations, credit maximization gives 
support for the following sense of qualified trust: 
Justified Qualified Trust. If a scientist A specialized in field F makes an assertion Φ, 
then scientist B is only justified in believing 𝜑 when 𝜑 is highly significant and clearly 
falsifiable. 
 
How can significance and falsifiability be estimated by scientist B? The former is 
relatively straightforward: since B is an expert in the field, B can directly infer, from his or her 
background knowledge, whether an assertion 𝜑 is significant or not. Hence B can assume that 
if A is making a highly significant assertion, A will know that it will attract replication research, 
and will want to minimize the probability of falsification.  
Falsifiability is more difficult to assess. Lack of falsifiability can sometimes be hidden 
by the author: one can always fail to mention some crucial limiting assumption that will prevent 
any conclusive confirmation or falsification (see again Zwaan et al. 2018). However, 
falsifiability of an assertion can be explicitly signaled by an author. For instance, the author 
can be minute in describing procedural detail, thus giving explicit instructions how to replicate 
the findings. Or, the author can share the raw data on which the assertion was based. These, 
not coincidentally, are some of the core measures proposed to increase reproducibility of 
research (Munafò et al. 2017). Such measures, perhaps more importantly, also increase trust in 
a credit-maximizing world since they signal falsifiability.  
 
5. Conclusion 
Default trust is necessary for a number of core scientific practices, such as peer review 
or collaboration. In a world where assertions can not only be true or not, but also significant or 
not and easily falsifiable or not, it becomes impossible to assume that scientists can be 
sufficiently incentivized to only make assertions that can be maximally replicated. In a complex 
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credit function, there are many different strategies to maximize credit, and not all of those 
strategies align with truth-telling. This means that default trust, in a credit-maximizing culture, 
cannot be justified.  
I would also like to caution against the normative inference that any absence of default 
trust is necessarily a bad thing. It may be ultimately beneficial for the scientific enterprise if 
the scientific community has some elements of the jungle, where the genuine and the fake need 
to be sifted, or where scientists jostle to make assertions of significances, even though this can 
occasionally lead to untrustworthy science.  
Nonetheless, what the argument does suggest is that in an extreme culture of credit-
maximization, default trust even within collaborations would no longer be justified: scientist 
B would need to be calculating whether it is in the best credit-maximizing interests of scientist 
A to do good work and make trustworthy assertions. Scientist B would need to be vigilant of 
the situation where scientist A could get away with sloppy work. This would no longer be a 
relationship of trust, and it is clear that tight-knit and efficient collaborations would no longer 
be possible.  
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